RECONCILING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE WITH CLIMATE
CHANGE MITIGATION:
A CASE STUDY OF NC SWINE CAFOS

D. Lee Miller1 and Ryke Longest2
Introduction: the Big Pig Problem ............................................................ 523
Chapter I: Rise of the Resistance .............................................................. 526
Chapter II: New Actors Change Strategic Landscape............................... 532
Title VI Complaint ................................................................................ 532
Nuisance Suits....................................................................................... 533
Corporate Sustainability ....................................................................... 536
Chapter III: Reconciling Climate Change Mitigation with Environmental
Justice ................................................................................................. 539
Conclusion................................................................................................. 542
INTRODUCTION: THE BIG PIG PROBLEM
For thirty years, the swine industry has externalized severe
environmental and health harms onto poor communities of color in Eastern
North Carolina. 3 This “Big Pig” problem is caused by the confinement,
consolidation, and concentration of industrial hog operations within the low,
flat, and economically marginalized Coastal Plain.4
Big Pig’s rise was not inevitable. As recently as 1982, more than 11,000
small swine farms freckled nearly all of North Carolina’s 100 counties.5 Then
came the “boom” of consolidation and industrialization that transformed hog
1.
Lecturing Fellow of Law, Duke Law School.
2.
Clinical Professor of Law, Duke Law School, and Co-Director of the Duke Environmental
Law and Policy Clinic, Duke Law School and Duke Nicholas School of the Environment.
3.
Kate Jenkins, Industrial Hog Farming and Environmental Racism (Dec. 20, 2015),
http://www.stirjournal.com/2015/12/20/industrial-hog-farming-and-environmental-racism/.
4.
See Bob Edwards & Anthony E. Ladd, Environmental Justice, Swine Production and Farm
Loss in North Carolina, 20 SOC. SPECTRUM 263, 264 (2000) (discussing concentration of swine
production on coastal plain and growing environmental justice concerns).
5.
Id. at 268 (“Of the nearly 11,400 farms in 1982 producing hogs and pigs . . . almost 60 percent
had less than 25 hogs.”)

524

VERMONT JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 21

production into a highly consolidated and vertically integrated industry. 6
Between 1989 and 1995, vertically integrated corporations and their contract
growers built 700 Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations 7 (CAFOs) in
Eastern North Carolina while 7,000 smaller hog farmers went out of
business. 8 The emergent “megalopolis” 9 of confinement houses quartered
8.2 million pigs10 that produced twice as much manure as the population of
New York City without a sewage treatment plant in sight.11
The new mega-facilities are concentrated in a handful of socially and
environmentally vulnerable communities in the Coastal Plain where the most
prominent geological features are sandy soils, high water tables, and
proximity to the coast.12 Ten North Carolina counties in the Coastal Plain
now account for ten percent of the entire swine inventory of the United
States.13 Nearly every hog is grown under contract to be slaughtered at the
world’s largest swine slaughter facility located in the small town of Tar Heel,
North Carolina.14
The 2,300 North Carolina swine CAFOs operating today rely on the socalled lagoon and spray field system. 15 Hog waste is flushed from
confinement barns into uncovered and unlined earthen pits, where it partially
digests before industrial sprinklers spray the effluent onto nearby cropland.16
6.
See id. at 264, 267 (discussing “explosion” of the North Carolina swine industry).
7.
CAFOs are Animal Feeding Operations (AFOs) distinguished by their size or their
designation as significant polluters of surface waters. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)-(c) (2020). AFOs are
livestock farms that raise animals in confinement. Id. § 122.23(b)(1).
8.
Edwards, supra note 4, at 267.
9.
Joby Warrick & Pat Stith, THE NEWS & OBSERVER, New Studies Show that Lagoons are
Leaking, THE PULITZER PRIZES (Feb. 19, 1995), https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/news-observer-raleighnc.
10. NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., HOGS AND PIGS: FINAL ESTIMATES
1993-1997 6 (1998) (noting 8.2 million swine in North Carolina in 1995).
11. Hannah Connor, Comprehensive Regulatory Review: Concentrated Animal Feeding
Operations Under the Clean Water Act From 1972 to the Present, 12 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 276, 276 (2011).
12. Our State Geography in a Snap: The Coastal Plain Region (Jan. 1, 2012),
https://www.ncpedia.org/geography/region/coastal-plain.
13. See NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 2019 NORTH CAROLINA
AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS: ONE HUNDRED YEARS AND COUNTING 42 (2019) (displaying swine data by
county).
14. See Paul Blest, A Stench in the Nostrils of God (Feb. 20, 2020),
https://theoutline.com/post/8633/smithfield-pork-tar-heel-north-carolina-industrial-farmslawsuits?zd=1&zi=tmcimmnh (describing Tar Heel slaughter facility). Local citizens later sued the state
for failing to conduct an environmental impact assessment of the facility, raising specific concerns about
cumulative and indirect impacts caused by new hog operations built to satisfy this increased processing
capacity. See generally Citizens for Clean Indus., Inc. v. Lofton, 427 S.E.2d 120 (1993).
15. USGS Studies Influence of Animal Feeding Operations on Stream Water Quality,
STORMWATER REPORT (Aug. 5, 2015), https://stormwater.wef.org/2015/08/usgs-studies-influenceanimal-feeding-operations-stream-water-quality/.
16. See Michelle Nowlin, Sustainable Production of Swine: Putting Lipstick on a Pig?, 37 VT. L.
REV. 1079, 1084–85 (2013) (describing the mechanics of the lagoon and spray field system).
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The lagoon and spray field system lies at the root of Big Pig’s environmental
harms, including water pollution, air pollution, antibiotic resistance, and
nuisance conditions.17
This pollution harms human health, especially the health of people who
live nearby. A comprehensive literature review found respiratory illness,
MRSA, Q fever, and stress/mood disorders are all “consistently and
positively associated” with living near a CAFO. 18 Local data confirm the
trend. Duke University researchers found that North Carolinians living near
a swine CAFO experienced a broad range of worse health outcomes
compared with a control group.19 Neighbors suffered higher rates of all-cause
mortality, infant mortality, mortality from anemia, kidney disease,
tuberculosis, septicemia, and low birth weight.20 These negative outcomes
robustly and inversely correlated with proximity to the nearest hog CAFO.21
North Carolinians do not bear these health costs equitably. The
environmental and public health harms of this system are a black-and-white
issue of environmental justice (EJ) because CAFOs were disproportionately
built in politically disenfranchised communities of color.22 Beginning in the
mid-1990s, community-based participatory research by University of North
Carolina epidemiologist Steve Wing investigated the locations and
community health impacts of CAFOs in Eastern North Carolina.23 He found
“a case study of environmental racism.” 24 Compared to the non-Hispanic
white population, Black people and Native Americans are respectively 1.4
and 2.39 times more likely to suffer the consequences of living within three
miles of a swine CAFO.25
17. See generally id. at 1085–96 (describing negative impacts of CAFOs); CARRIER HRIBAR,
NAT’L ASS’N OF LOCAL BDS. OF HEALTH, UNDERSTANDING CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING
OPERATIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON COMMUNITIES 5–11 (2010) (describing negative impacts of CAFOs).
18. Joan A. Casey et al., Industrial Food Animal Production and Community Health, 2 CURRENT
ENVTL. HEALTH REP. 259, 259 (2015).
19. Julia Kravchenko et al., Mortality and Health Outcomes in North Carolina Communities
Located in Close Proximity to Hog Concentrated Animal Feeding Operation, 79 N.C. MED. J. 278, 278
(2018).
20. Id. at 278, 281–84.
21. Id. at 278, 285.
22. See, e.g., STEVE WING & JILL JOHNSTON, DEP’T OF EPIDEMIOLOGY, UNIV. OF N.C.,
INDUSTRIAL HOG OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACT AFRICANAMERICANS, HISPANICS AND AMERICAN INDIANS 1 (2015); Wendee Nicole, CAFOs and Environmental
Justice:
The
Case
of
North
Carolina,
121 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A182, A183
(2013); Edwards, supra note 4, at 266.
23. See generally Steve Wing et al., Community Based Collaboration for Environmental Justice:
South-East Halifax Environmental Reawakening, 8 ENV’T. & URBANIZATION 129 (1996) (describing
environmental racism near hog production facilities).
24. Id. at 129. Wing uses “environmental racism” to describe how “[i]nstitutional racism connects
with exposure to environmental hazards when inequalities of political and economic power result in a
discriminatory pattern of location of polluting industries and wastes.” Id. at 131.
25. WING & JOHNSTON, supra note 22, at 6.
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Lagoons break down solid and liquid waste into gasses, creating air
pollution. 26 Liquid waste sprayed onto fields runs off or seeps into
groundwater. 27 CAFOs emit volatile organic compounds (VOCs) like
dimethyl sulfide, ammonia, hydrogen sulfide, and particulate matter. 28
Antibiotic-resistant pathogens travel through both air and water vectors.29
Now, as global concern over climate change drives corporate demand to
decarbonize supply chains, market forces exert pressure for converting
existing lagoon and spray field CAFOs into biogas factories. Biogas
mitigates GHG emissions by combusting methane into CO2 while generating
revenue from electricity sales and carbon offset credits.30 Reconciling the
interests of EJ, local natural resources, and the global climate requires
agribusiness to reinvest some of this financial boon into the clean
technologies they have promised—and shirked—for decades.
CHAPTER I: RISE OF THE RESISTANCE
North Carolina became the fastest-growing swine-producing state in the
country during the early 1990s.31 From the very beginning of that boom, a
clutch of grassroots community groups formed to oppose the lagoon and
spray field system. 32 They asked local government leaders to slow
construction. 33 Residents rightly feared that large swine farms promising
economic development would instead deliver air pollution, noxious odors,
groundwater contamination, surface water pollution, the loss of independent
family farms, farmland loss, and the loss of rural vitality and institutions.34
One group, the Concerned Citizens of Tillery, successfully pushed county
26. Dan Charles, Big Companies Bet On Cleaner Power From Pig Poop Ponds (Nov. 22, 2019),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2019/11/22/781565978/big-companies-bet-on-cleaner-power-frompig-poop-ponds (“On most farms, that gas just goes floating off into the air — and contributes to the
overheating of the planet. Methane is a greenhouse gas with a warming impact at least 25 times greater,
per pound, than carbon dioxide.”).
27. See generally Casey et al., supra note 18 (discussing the impacts of swine CAFOs, including
to ground- and surface water).
28. HRIBAR, supra note 17, at 5.
29. See Casey et al., supra note 18, at 260 (summarizing the transmission of antibiotic-resistant
pathogens).
30. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ET AL., BIOGAS OPPORTUNITIES ROADMAP 12 (2014); NAT’L
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., ENERGY ANALYSIS: BIOGAS POTENTIAL IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2013).
31. Edwards, supra note 4, at 263.
32. Elisabeth Stoddard, Neoliberal Governance and Environmental Risk, in POLITICAL
ECOLOGIES OF MEAT 137, 146 (Jody Emel & Harvey Neo, eds., 2015). These groups included the
Concerned Citizens of Tillery, the Alliance for a Responsible Swine Industry, the Rural Empowerment
Association for Community Help, and the North Carolina Environmental Justice Network. Id.
33. See id. (describing pressures the community groups put on the state).
34. Steve Wing, Social Responsibility and Research Ethics in Community-Driven Studies of
Industrialized Hog Production, 110 ENVT. HEALTH PERSP. 437, 438 (2002).
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officials to enact a local health ordinance requiring basic environmental
protections missing from state laws.35 Other groups ensured that anti-CAFO
zoning ordinances proliferated at the county level.36 But legal challenges and
state preemption ultimately de-clawed local resistance.37
Then a series of catastrophic lagoon breeches and hurricanes in the mid1990s transmuted a local environmental problem into a political problem for
state government. Operational deficiencies caused a lagoon breach in 1995
that spilled 25 million gallons of hog waste into the New River.38 In 1996,
The (Raleigh) News and Observer published a Pulitzer-Prize-winning series,
“Boss Hog,” exposing how corporate swine interests had captured the
legislature and wrought a toxic landscape in Eastern North Carolina. 39
During Hurricane Floyd in 1999, heavy rains caused at least five lagoons to
burst; forty-seven other lagoons flooded, spilling their contents into the
landscape.40
Responding to community groups, the widespread spills, and the “Boss
Hog” press, Governor Hunt convened the Blue Ribbon Commission on
Agricultural Waste to study swine CAFO pollution. 41 The Commission’s
report found egregious violations and urged legislative action.42 In 1997, the
legislature put a temporary moratorium on new lagoons that prohibited new
lagoon and spray field waste management systems, absent strict
environmental performance standards.43 Since 1997, no new lagoons have
been lawfully built, absent exceptions to the moratorium. 44 Thousands of
existing lagoons were grandfathered in, and dozens of new lagoons were built
under moratorium exceptions.45
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Craig v. Cty. of Chatham, 565 S.E.2d 172 (2002) (finding a town ordinance to be
preempted by state law).
38. Huge Spill of Hog Waste Fuels an Old Debate in North Carolina, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1995,
§ 1, at 21.
39. See
The
News
&
Observer
(Raleigh,
NC),
THE PULITZER PRIZES,
https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/news-observer-raleigh-nc (last visited May 1, 2020) (naming the “Boss
Hog” article series as the 1996 Pulitzer Prize Winner in Public Service); Pat Stith et al., THE NEWS &
OBSERVER, Boss Hog: The Power of Pork, North Carolina’s Pork Revolution, THE PULITZER PRIZES
(Feb. 19, 1995), https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/news-observer-raleigh-nc (describing the relationship
between the hog industry and North Carolina).
40. Nowlin, supra note 16, at 1088.
41. See DAVID KIRBY, ANIMAL FACTORY 144, 147 (2010) (describing the research of “the
governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Agricultural Waste”).
42. Id.
43. See generally 1997 N.C. Sess. Laws 458 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143215.10A (2013)) (enacting a moratorium on the construction or expansion of swine farms and lagoons).
44. CAFO
Wars
Continue
(Mar.
12,
2019),
https://www.yadkinriverkeeper.org/news/2019/3/12/cafo-wars-continue.
45. Talia Buford, A Hog Waste Agreement Lacked Teeth, and Some North Carolinians Say They’re
Left to Suffer (Nov. 23, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/article/a-hog-waste-agreement-lacked-teeth-
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The 1997 law also added state permitting and inspection requirements—
a landmark victory at the time. 46 North Carolina’s Department of
Environmental Quality (DEQ) requires facilities with more than 250 hogs to
have either a state permit or a permit under the Clean Water Act’s National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).47 Virtually all hog farms
use the State’s general permit rather than its more stringent federal
counterpart. 48 Optimism over the inspection and permit system was short
lived. Permitting fell far short of community hopes, in large part because
DEQ has consistently issued permits without considering the additional
burden placed on communities of color.49 Inspections suffer from funding
cuts and public records exemptions.50
Indeed, if the permit system had lived up to its facial promises, the
disproportionate burden borne by communities of color would at least have
been much lighter. But DEQ’s swine permits are fundamentally flawed. They
are predicated on the legal fiction that regulated facilities do not pollute
public waters; they are classified as non-discharge facilities.51 The fiction
that these facilities do not discharge rests on magical thinking backed by
models.52 Permittees must spray waste at “agronomic rates,” meaning that
nitrogen applied through manure balances with the theoretical nitrogen
uptake by crops.53 Yet the permit does not require ground- or surface-water
monitoring except when regulators observe permit violations, a catch-22.54
Worse, the permit exempts from the definition of a discharge any waste that
and-some-north-carolinians-say-left-to-suffer; Despite Moratorium, More Hog Farms Built in North
Carolina in Past 10 Years (Mar. 23, 2007), https://thepigsite.com/news/2007/03/despite-moratoriummore-hog-farms-built-in-north-carolina-in-past-10-years-1.
46. See generally 1997 N.C. Sess. Law 458 (describing permitting requirements); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 143-215.10C (discussing applications and permits to construct or operate an animal waste management
system); id. § 143-215.10F (discussing inspection program).
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.10C(a)(1); 15A N.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 02T (2018).
48. See List of Permitted Animal Facilities, N.C. DEP’T ENVTL. QUALITY (Nov. 6, 2019),
https://files.nc.gov/ncdeq/List_Of%20Permitted_Animal_Facilities2019-11-06.xls (listing data on
permitted animal facilities in North Carolina).
49. Infra, Chapter III; Complaint at 34–41, Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t of Envtl.
Quality (Sept. 3, 2014), https://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/files/North-Carolina-EJ-Network-et-alComplaint-under-Title-VI.pdf.
50. Stoddard, supra note 32, at 148–49.
51. STEPHEN L. HARDEN, U.S. DEP’T. OF THE INTERIOR, SURFACE-WATER QUALITY IN
AGRICULTURAL WATERSHEDS OF THE NORTH CAROLINA COASTAL PLAIN ASSOCIATED WITH
CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS 2 (2015).
52. See, e.g., id. at 47 (discussing analysis to identify differences in watersheds associated with
either having or not having CAFO manure effects).
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.10C(e)(6)–(7); id. § 413-215.10C(f); see also DEP’T OF ENVTL.
QUALITY , N.C. ENVTL. MGMT. COMM’N, SWINE WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM GENERAL PERMIT 1, 3
(2014) [hereinafter GENERAL PERMIT] (listing permit requirements).
54. See generally DEP’T ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 53 (showing no ground or surface water
monitoring requirement).
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spills during a 25-year, 24-hour storm event—defined as the strongest storm
with a probable recurrence interval of 25 years.55 Eastern North Carolina has
experienced two 1,000-year storms in the past four years.56
In 2000, North Carolina’s then Attorney General Mike Easley reached
an agreement with Smithfield and its subsidiaries to identify replacement
technology for grandfathered lagoons. 57 Smithfield committed to fund
research on new environmentally superior waste treatment technologies
(ESTs).58 The company agreed to install ESTs on all company-owned farms
within three years from the date that the “designee” determined that they met
environmental performance standards and proved “technically,
operationally, and economically feasible.” 59 Smithfield also agreed to
provide assistance for their contract farmers to install ESTs.60
The environmental performance standards specified ESTs must 1)
eliminate all animal waste discharges to surface and ground water; and
substantially eliminate 2) atmospheric ammonia emissions; 3) odor
detectable beyond the farm boundary; 4) disease-transmitting vectors and
airborne pathogens; and 5) nutrient and heavy metal contamination of soil
and groundwater.61 Notably, the Smithfield Agreement left out methane as a
pollutant subject to performance standards, as had the moratorium legislation
before it.62
An engineering committee under the Smithfield Agreement labored to
set standards based on different interpretations of “substantially eliminate.”
For example, the committee decided that, in the case of ammonia emissions,
“substantially eliminate” meant a 60% reduction compared to a typical swine
farm. 63 In the intervening years, multiple ESTs tested on North Carolina

55. Id. at 2.
56. See James Bruggers, After Back-to-Back Hurricanes, North Carolina Reconsiders Climate
Change (Dec. 27, 2018), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/27122018/hurricane-damage-northcarolina-climate-change-2018-year-review-florence-michael-matthew (describing major rain events in
North Carolina); Jason Samenow, Florence was Another 1,000-year Rain Event. Is This the New Normal
as the Planet Warms? (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2018/09/18/florencewas-another-year-rain-event-is-this-new-normal-planet-warms/ (explaining the increase in number of rare
storms).
57. Agreement between the Attorney General of North Carolina et al., at 1–6 (July 25, 2000),
https://projects.ncsu.edu/cals/waste_mgt/smithfield_projects/agreement.pdf [hereinafter Smithfield
Agreement].
58. Id. at 2–3.
59. Id. at 3–5.
60. Id. at 13.
61. Id. at 4.
62. See generally id. (showing no methane provisions).
63. SMITHFIELD
AGREEMENT
ADVISORY
PANEL
ENGINEERING
SUBCOMMITTEE,
ENVIRONMENTALLY SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE CRITERIA DEFINITIONS: RECOMMENDATIONS DOCUMENT
2,
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swine farms proved capable of meeting—and far exceeding—the
environmental performance standards.64 The third generation of a treatment
technology called Super Soils “was documented to remove approximately
99% of total suspended solids, 98% of [chemical oxygen demand], 99% of
TKN (Total Kjeldahl nitrogen), 100% ammonia, 92% phosphorus, 95%
copper, and 97% zinc from the flushed manure. Fecal coliform reductions
were measured to be 99.98%.”65
A separate economic subcommittee set out to define “economically
feasible.”66 A majority of the subcommittee agreed on a standard that would
keep at least 88% of swine farms in business.67 Four dissenting members,
representing swine companies and an agricultural bank, wrote a dissenting
report contending that the standard should be “no net increase in cost”
compared to the lagoon and spray field system. 68 Industry’s dissent
contradicted the terms of the Smithfield Agreement: “The parties understand
and agree that alternative technologies that cost more than the lagoon and
spray field system may be determined to be economically feasible.” 69 As
early as 2006, designee Dr. C. Mike Williams concluded that Super Soils
“comprise an unconditional Environmentally Superior Technology for new
farms” meeting all EST requirements and economic feasibility.70
Seven years into the Smithfield Agreement, the lagoons and spray fields
operated unabated. 71 In 2007, frustrated community groups championed a
bill that would have banned all new lagoons and prohibited any swine facility
from installing new waste treatment systems without adopting ESTs. 72 It
would have given grants to any producers who installed any of the five waste
http://projects.ncsu.edu/cals/waste_mgt/smithfield_projects/phase1report04/Appendix%20D(Engineerin
g).pdf.
64. See C.M. WILLIAMS, ANIMAL & POULTRY WASTE MGMT. CTR., N.C. STATE UNIV.,
EVALUATION OF GENERATION 3 TREATMENT TECHNOLOGY FOR SWINE WASTE 2 (2013) (noting second
and third generation technologies achieved efficient environmental performance at reduced costs).
65. Id. at 3.
66. See CHANTAL LINE CARPENTIER ET AL., MAJORITY REPORT FROM THE ECONOMICS
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE ADVISORY PANEL TO THE DESIGNEE UNDER THE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH CAROLINA AND SMITHFIELD FOODS, PREMIUM STANDARD FARMS AND
FRONTLINE FARMERS REGARDING RECOMMENDATIONS ON ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY DETERMINATIONS
30–31
(2005),
https://projects.ncsu.edu/cals/waste_mgt/smithfield_projects/phase3report06/pdfs/Appendix%20D.pdf
(presenting letter within majority report seeking to define “economically feasible”).
67. See id. at 6, 20 (agreeing with 12% reduction in swine operation to obtain better waste
handling).
68. Id. at 3.
69. Smithfield Agreement, supra note 57, at 10.
70. MIKE WILLIAMS, DEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENTALLY SUPERIOR TECHNOLOGIES: PHASE 3
REPORT 6 (2006).
71. See Stoddard, supra note 32, at 147 (noting that five ESTs had been developed, yet none were
implemented); Buford, supra note 45 (noting that hog farmers continued to store hog waste in lagoons).
72. Stoddard, supra note 32, at 147.
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management technologies approved as ESTs through the Smithfield
Agreement.73
After passing the NC Senate with unanimous support, then-Governor
Mike Easley pulled the bill before it could pass the House.74 It was replaced
with a bill developed with industry support.75 The new bill retained the ban
on construction of any new lagoons without ESTs, but dispensed with the
regulations on expanding facilities.76 Perhaps most significantly, the new bill
substituted comprehensive financial support for ESTs with a pilot program
for producers to capture lagoon methane and sell it at subsidized prices for
electricity generation.77 As one commentator noted, “the legislation rolled
back the more restrictive regulations in the original bill and turned the
industry’s hog waste into a commodity that was to be subsidized by the
state’s citizens.”78
Methane capture could be a revenue source because it was not regulated
at all. Methane itself is odorless and thus not covered by North Carolina odor
standards.79 While state water quality permits for swine are weak, air permits
for swine are nonexistent.80 Like the Clean Air Act regulations before, and
the Smithfield Agreement that would follow, the state swine permit contains
no standards for methane emissions.81 Omitting methane preserved Clean Air
Act loopholes that allowed CAFOs to emit unlimited atmospheric methane,
which in turn allows these emissions sources to meet “additionality”
requirements of voluntary carbon markets.82 Thusly were the seeds sown for
the nascent biogas industry, now on the rise twenty years later.
Community groups rose in opposition to the lagoon and spray field
system. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, they erected zoning restrictions,
filed nuisance suits, and catalyzed the state’s legislature and executive
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 523 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.10I); see also North
Carolina
Finalizes
Swine
Lagoon
Ban
(Sept.
20,
2007),
https://www.nationalhogfarmer.com/news/newsflash/north-carolina-finalizes-lagoon-ban
(discussing
new bill).
76. North Carolina Finalizes Swine Lagoon Ban, supra note 75.
77. Stoddard, supra note 32, at 147–48.
78. Id. at 148.
79. Lan Luo, Properties of Methane Gas (Feb. 23, 2020), https://sciencing.com/propertiesmethane-gas-5090934.html; see generally 15A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 02D § .1800 (2000) (lacking methane
in odor standards).
80. See generally GENERAL PERMIT, supra note 53 (listing permitting requirements). The general
permit applies to any swine animal feeding operation in North Carolina, but it does not regulate air
pollution. Id.
81. See generally id. (containing no standards for methane emissions).
82. See Steven Ferrey, When 1+1 No Longer Equals 2: The New Math of Legal “Additionality”
Controlling World and U.S. Global Warming Regulation, 10 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 591, 591–94 (2009)
(describing “additionalities”).
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powers to pass a lagoon moratorium, implement a permitting regime, and
pressure industry into a landmark agreement.83 Yet 25 years into the lagoon
and spray field era, activism had failed to stop—let alone reverse—the
environmental, social, or human health problems caused by concentrated
swine.84 By the early 2010’s, the environmental and EJ communities began
to look for new strategies.
CHAPTER II: NEW ACTORS CHANGE STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE
Around 2014, three new actors emerged to challenge the status quo: a
mature and coordinated EJ community; well-resourced plaintiffs’ attorneys;
and corporate sustainability divisions of major firms.85 Each opened a new
legal assault against Big Pig’s pollution. Each sought different remedies:
compensatory and punitive monetary damages for past harms; change to the
regulatory schema that account and correct for permitting inequities to
prevent future hams; and emissions accounting and reductions in order to
decarbonize the corporate supply chain. 86 Each remedy comes with a
significant price tag, at least up front. But, while the infrastructure to capture
methane for biogas will lower GHG emissions, it will not improve the daily
lives of nearby residents.87 The extent to which climate mitigation and EJ
interests get reconciled will mold the legal and physical landscape for a
generation to come.
Title VI Complaint
By 2014, the community organizations that first resisted the CAFO boom
had blossomed into a coordinated network of environmental justice leaders.
In 2014, Earthjustice, on behalf of the North Carolina Environmental Justice
Network, the Rural Empowerment Association for Community Help, and the
Waterkeepers Alliance, filed a complaint with the Environmental Protection

83. See generally Stoddard, supra note 32, at 137–49 (describing community groups’ actions
throughout the history of swine CAFOs).
84. See Lily Kuo, The World Eats Cheap Bacon at the Expense of North Carolina’s Rural
Poor, QUARTZ (Jul. 14, 2015), https://qz.com/433750/the-world-eats-cheap-bacon-at-the-expense-ofnorth-carolinas-rural-poor/ (outlining the struggles of activists and those affected by swine CAFOs).
85. See CHRISTINE BALL-BLAKELY, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, CAFOS: PLAGUING NORTH
CAROLINA COMMUNITIES OF COLOR 30–37 (2018) (discussing coordinated community movement against
CAFOs).
86. Id.
87. See Nicole, supra note 22, at A188 (noting methane digester will not, on its own, reduce odors,
pathogens, and heavy metals).
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Agency’s (EPA) Office of Civil Rights. 88 The complaint alleged that the
lagoon and spray field system disproportionately impacted communities of
color with many types of pollution and that the state, through its permitting
system, failed to address these racial disparities in violation of Title VI of the
federal Civil Rights Act.89
After preliminary investigation, the EPA issued a Letter of Concern to
DEQ in 2017. 90 Its investigators found “adverse impacts from industrial
swine operations on communities of color” 91 and “retaliation, threats,
intimidation, and harassment by swine facility operators and pork industry
representatives” against residents who filed complaints. 92 The letter
seemingly rattled DEQ officials, who did not wait for the EPA to complete
its full investigation before settling in 2018. 93 The settlement terms,
negotiated with the same community organizations that DEQ had ignored for
decades, put new arrows in the quivers of communities fighting for greater
protections from CAFO pollution. 94 Among other terms, state officials
agreed to propose specific updates to the state swine general permit; 95
develop and implement an Environmental Justice tool;96 and take steps to
broaden community participation in state permitting processes.97
Nuisance Suits
In 2014, plaintiffs’ attorneys filed nuisance suits on behalf of 500+
neighbors of swine CAFOs claiming that the lagoon and spray field system
harmed the use and enjoyment of their property. 98 This was not the first
88. See generally Complaint Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d,
40 C.F.R. Part 7, (2014) at 1, https://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/files/North-Carolina-EJ-Networket-al-Complaint-under-Title-VI.pdf (submitting administrative complaint to the EPA Office of Civil
Rights).
89. Id. at 3, 12–13.
90. Letter from EPA External Civil Right Compliance Office, Office of General Counsel, to
William G. Ross, Jr., Acting Secretary, North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality, (Jan. 12,
2017), http://waterkeeper.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Letter-to-Complainants-in-Case-11R-14-R4Forwarding-Letter-of-Concern-to-NC-DEQ-1-12-2017.pdf.
91. Id. at 3.
92. Id. at 4.
93. Settlement Agreement between N.C. Dep’t. of Envtl. Quality et. al. (May 3, 2018),
https://files.nc.gov/ncdeq/documents/files/Final%20Settlement%20Agreement_attachments%20and%20
sig.pdf.
94. See id. at 1 (naming parties to the agreement).
95. Id. at 4–5.
96. Id. at 6.
97. Id. at 7–8.
98. See, e.g., Complaint of Linda Atkinson, et al., In re NC Swine Farm Nuisance Litig., No. 5:15cv-00013-BR, 2017 WL 5178038 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 8, 2017); Complaint of Bertha Lee Carter Battle et.al.,
In re NC Swine Farm Nuisance Litig., No. 5:15-cv-00013-BR, 2017 WL 5178038 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 8,
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attempt to use nuisance law to rein in CAFO pollution, nor even the first to
produce eye-catching verdicts. 99 Nuisance suits proliferated nationwide in
the late 1990s.100 In 2010, a Missouri court awarded neighbors $11 million
in damages caused by a swine mega-farm owned by Premium Standard
Foods, a Smithfield subsidiary.101
Earlier nuisance actions floundered in North Carolina. Former U.S.
Senator Robert Morgan sued a swine CAFO in the mid-1990s claiming that
fumes from the lagoons were “often so noxious that at times it burns their
eyes and noses, making it difficult for [plaintiffs] to see and breathe.” 102
Senator Morgan lost the case. In contrast, the civil actions brought in 2014 to
abate nuisances caused by the lagoon and spray field system have been
groundbreaking.103
Two strategic choices help explain the revival of common law remedies
to hold Big Pig accountable. First, the cases name Smithfield, not the contract
growers who grow most of Smithfield’s hogs, even though some of the
targeted farms were owned by contract growers.104 The court found that the
contract growers were not a necessary party to the litigation,105 successfully
opening up the $15 billion multi-national company106 to damages without
pinning them on the contract growers. In the process, plaintiffs reaped a

2017); Complaint of Alex Bordeaux et. al., In re NC Swine Farm Nuisance Litig., No. 5:15-cv-00013BR, 2017 WL 5178038 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 8, 2017).
99. Leah Douglas, “Finally, Somebody Heard What the People Were Saying was Happening to
Them” (May 1, 2018), https://www.motherjones.com/food/2018/05/the-growing-grassroots-oppositionto-industrial-hog-farming-just-scored-a-major-victory/.
100. Lisa Sorg, Neutering Nuisance Laws in North Carolina (Nov. 15, 2017),
http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2017/11/15/neutering-nuisance-laws-north-carolina/.
101. See Owens v. ContiGroup Cos., 344 S.W.3d 717 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (affirming the lower
court’s decision to award plaintiffs over $11 million in damages); Allan Ripp, Missouri Jury Awards
Residents $11 Million in Damages From Living Under Cloud of Stench Caused by Industrial Hog Farms,
SPEER L. FIRM (Mar. 5, 2010), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/missouri-jury-awardsresidents-11-million-in-damages-from-living-under-cloud-of-stench-caused-by-industrial-hog-farms86643287.html.
102. Parker v. Barefoot, 502 S.E.2d 42, 44 (1998), overruled by Parker v. Barefoot, 519 S.E.2d
315 (1999).
103. In re NC Swine Farm Nuisance Litig., No. 5:15-cv-00013-BR, 2017 WL 5178038 (E.D.N.C.
Nov. 8, 2017); Barry Yeoman, Here are the Rural Residents Who Sued the World’s Largest Hog Producer
Over Waste and Odors—and Won, FOOD & ENVTL. REPORTING NETWORK (Dec. 20, 2019),
https://thefern.org/2019/12/rural-north-carolinians-won-multimillion-dollar-judgments-against-theworlds-largest-hog-producer-will-those-cases-now-be-overturned/.
104. Complaint of Linda Atkinson et al., supra note 98; Complaint of Bertha Lee Carter Battle
et.al., supra note 98; Complaint of Alex Bordeaux et. al., supra note 98; Yeoman, supra note 103.
105. In re NC Swine Farm Nuisance Litig., No. 15-cv-00013, 2017 BL 176858, at *6 (finding that
the company was in full control of grower operations and awards, directed the type and amount of feed,
directed waste disposal method and, in several cases, directed the siting of the contract grower’s
operation).
106. Buford, supra note 45.
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tactical advantage by focusing on decisions made by corporate officers rather
than overstretched family farmers.
Second, plaintiffs’ attorneys filed in federal court.107 They relied on the
diversity jurisdiction created by Smithfield, a Virginia corporation, owning
all of the hogs through Murphy-Brown, a corporation registered in Delaware
and controlled by Smithfield through a wholly owned subsidiary also
registered in Delaware.108
The cases presented temporary nuisance claims.109 Complainants alleged
that the hog facilities caused a range of problems—such as odors, ammonia
emissions, pests, and truck noise—negatively affecting the use of plaintiffs’
property. 110 Plaintiffs suffered health effects that included burning eyes,
respiratory problems, headaches, anxiety, and spikes in blood pressure.111
Plaintiffs’ claims alleged harms that ESTs were designed to remedy or
prevent. The complaints allege additional wrongdoing that merit punitive
damages.112 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant and their
executives knew about the nuisance, had the EST technology and financial
resources to take corrective action, and failed to do so negligently and
improperly.113
Five jury pools have produced verdicts in these cases that ranged from
the hundreds of thousands to hundreds of millions of dollars.114 The largest
reached $473.5 million,115 later reduced to $94 million by mandatory state
caps on punitive damages.116 Smithfield appealed and key issues from the
first five trials are now before the Fourth Circuit, which heard oral arguments
on January 31, 2020.117
One of the big questions is whether the amended “Right to Farm” law,
passed to deter nuisance suits, should apply retroactively. In the wake of the
first large verdicts, the North Carolina legislature updated the State’s Right
107. Third Amended Complaint, McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, No. 7:14-cv-00180-BR, 2018
WL 4189408 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 12, 2018).
108. Id. ¶¶ 25–28.
109. Id. ¶¶ 220–35.
110. Id. ¶ 3.
111. Id. ¶ 31, 219; Yeoman, supra note 103.
112. Third Amended Complaint, supra note 107, ¶ 236–39.
113. Id. ¶ 230.
114. McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, No. 7:14-CV-180-BR, 2018 WL 10322917, at *1 (E.D.N.C.
May 7, 2018).
115. See Verdict, James Jacobs, et al., v. Murphy-Brown LLC, No. 7:14-CV-237-BR (E.D.N.C.
Aug. 13, 2018) (outlining the amount of recovery and punitive damages each plaintiff was entitled to,
which adds up to $473.5 million).
116. N.C. GEN. STAT. §1D-25(b) (2019).
117. See Oral Argument Calendar, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT,
https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/oral-argument/cal/january-2020-session (last visited May 2, 2020) (setting
the oral argument date for Joyce McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, LLC for Friday, January 31, 2020).
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to Farm law to make it virtually impossible for similarly situated neighbors
to bring these kind of nuisance claims in the future.118 Based on this claim,
an appellate court could overturn a key lower court ruling or remand for
procedural reasons.119 On the other hand, if the Fourth Circuit upholds the
damage awards, Smithfield may find that installing technology they have
resisted for decades will no longer seem so “economically infeasible.”120
Corporate Sustainability
Independent of the EJ communities’ concerns, a major shift in the
industry’s handling of waste is on the horizon. Retailers have begun adopting
GHG reduction targets throughout their supply chains to “green” their
corporate image and demonstrate that private law can step in where
governments have failed.121 In 2012, Walmart began conditioning purchase
orders on suppliers' use of a “Sustainability Index” that rates product
sustainability across 100 metrics. 122 Then, in 2017, Walmart set a goal of
avoiding one billion metric tons of GHGs by 2030.123 Walmart flexed its
monopsony power as the nation’s largest grocery store over suppliers like
Smithfield. 124 These “green” commitments are pushing suppliers like
Smithfield to reduce emissions or risk the loss of critical retail outlets.
At the same time, energy companies and their corporate customers are
demanding renewable and low-carbon feedstock for their power plants and
118. N.C. GEN. STAT §§ 106-701, 106-702 (2019). In nuisance actions against agricultural and
forestry operations, plaintiffs must be the legal possessor of the property; the property must lie within ½
mile of the nuisance source; and the action must be filed within 1 year of the operations establishment or
major change causing the nuisance. Id. Section 106-702 limits compensatory damages to the reduction in
fair market value of the affected property and limits punitive damages to cases where there has been a
criminal conviction or civil enforcement action by an environmental regulatory agency. Id.
119. See Parker v. Barefoot, 502 S.E.2d 42 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (overruled by Parker v. Barefoot,
519 S.E.2d 315 (1999) on the grounds that the jury was given improper instructions regarding the nuisance
statute).
120. Anne Blythe, Jury Awards More than $25 Million to Duplin County Couple in Hog-Farm
Case (June 29, 2018), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/article214096384.html.
121. See, e.g., More Than 300 Companies Commit to Set Science-Based Emissions Reduction
Targets, WORLD RES. INST., https://www.wri.org/our-work/top-outcome/more-300-companies-commitset-science-based-emissions-reduction-targets (last visited May 2, 2020) (showing that companies make
their own rules they must follow to reduce GHG).
122. Walmart Announcements New Commitments to Drive Sustainability Deeper into the
Company’s
Global
Supply
Chain
(Oct.
25,
2012),
https://corporate.walmart.com/newsroom/2012/10/25/walmart-announces-new-commitments-to-drivesustainability-deeper-into-the-companys-global-supply-chain.
123. Walmart on Track to Reduce 1 Billion Metric Tons of Emissions from Global Supply Chains
by 2030 (May 8, 2019), https://corporate.walmart.com/newsroom/2019/05/08/walmart-on-track-toreduce-1-billion-metric-tons-of-emissions-from-global-supply-chains-by-2030.
124. Project Gigaton, https://www.walmartsustainabilityhub.com/project-gigaton (last visited May
2, 2020).
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pipelines. North Carolina’s Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard provides a
growing market for waste-to-energy projects. 125 North Carolina’s Clean
Energy Plan, a product of the governor’s executive order126 to meet Paris
Accord targets, requires significant reductions in the State’s energy-related
GHG emissions. 127 Increasing demand further, there are growing
opportunities to sell carbon credits from manure management practices into
voluntary markets.128
Broadly, there are two kinds of market pressure at play. On the one hand,
major corporate retailers of low-cost meat, like Walmart, are demanding a
lower carbon footprint from their supply chain.129 On the other hand, natural
gas pipeline project investors are hoping to offer renewable gas.130 Together,
market signals point in the direction of “greening” the corporate
sustainability chain for major corporations on the food side, but also
“greening” the gas side.
The loophole that ignores methane creates the business opportunity. If
either the EPA or the states regulated methane emissions from CAFOs,
methane captured for electricity production could neither be credited toward
Walmart’s reduction targets nor used to generate carbon offset credits, which
require mitigation beyond baseline levels (the “additionality”
requirement). 131 In a counterfactual world with a methane mandate, there
would be no new economic rents 132 to divvy up through private law
arrangements between corporate sustainability offices, hog producers, and
electricity companies.

125. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133.8 (2019) (promoting the development of renewable energy and
energy efficiency in the state).
126. North Carolina’s Commitment to Address Climate Change and Transition to a Clean Energy
Economy, N.C. Exec. Order No. 80 (Oct. 29, 2018).
127. N.C. DEP’T ENVTL. QUALITY, NORTH CAROLINA CLEAN ENERGY PLAN: TRANSITIONING TO
A 21ST CENTURY ELECTRICITY SYSTEM (2019).
128. CALIFORNIA AIR RES. BD., DRAFT SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANT REDUCTION
STRATEGY 11 (2015).
129. Pippa Stevens, Behind Walmart’s Push to Eliminate 1 Gigaton of Greenhouse Gases by 2030
(Dec. 15, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/15/walmarts-project-gigaton-is-its-most-ambitiousclimate-goal-yet.html.
130. Renewable
Natural
Gas
Production,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
ENERGY,
https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/natural_gas_renewable.html (last visited May 2, 2020).
131. See generally Umair Irfan, Can You Really Negate Your Carbon Emissions? Carbon Offsets,
Explained (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/2/27/20994118/carbon-offset-climate-change-netzero-neutral-emissions (explaining that “additionality” is a key principle to consider when making a
reliable offset). The article draws the example of an additionality as “a counterfactual: Does buying this
specific offset lead to a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions that would not have happened otherwise?”
Id.
132. NANCY CARTWRIGHT, COUNTERFACTUALS IN ECONOMICS: A COMMENTARY 1 (2007)
(counterfactuals are “causal surrogates” that defines causal relationships in economics).
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Instead, climate change has created market signals that are pushing
integrators to reduce the carbon embedded in their supply chain and pulling
them into new biogas revenue streams.133 Smithfield inventoried all of its
lagoons in response to Walmart’s demands.134 In 2016, Smithfield promised
to reduce its GHG emissions 25% below 2010 levels by the year 2025.135
Two years later, Smithfield explained that it would meet this goal by
retrofitting existing lagoons with “manure-to-energy” capabilities, including
across 90% of Smithfield-owned hog-finishing facilities in North Carolina.136
All told, the company expects to capture 85,000 tons of methane each year
to generate renewable natural gas.137
In fall 2018, Smithfield and the energy company Dominion committed
to spend at least $250 million to build biogas infrastructure in North Carolina,
Virginia, and Utah. 138 A year later, the companies announced they were
doubling that commitment to $500 million dollars in an effort “to become the
largest renewable natural gas supplier in the U.S.”139 The first North Carolina
project, which will collect methane from 19 farms in the hog belt, will be
constructed in 2020 and produce approximately 300,000 dekatherms. 140
Once refined, the gas will be injected into the ever-expanding Piedmont

133. 2018 Integrated Report, Case Study: Expanding Our Efforts to Generate Renewable Energy
SMITHFIELD
FOODS
SUSTAINABILITY,
https://www.smithfieldfoods.com/integratedreport/2018/environment/case-study-expanding-our-efforts-to-generate-renewable-energy-2 (last visited
May 2, 2020).
134. Maggie Monast, What Food Companies Can Learn from Smithfield Foods Exceeding its Grain
Sustainability
Goal,
ENVTL.
DEF.
FUND
(Feb.
25,
2019),
http://blogs.edf.org/growingreturns/2019/02/25/smithfield-exceeds-grain-sustainability-goal/.
135. Press Release, Smithfield Foods, Smithfield Foods Leads Industry as First Major Protein
Company
to
Adopt
Greenhouse
Gas
Reduction
Goal
(Dec.
5,
2016),
https://www.smithfieldfoods.com/press-room/company-news/smithfield-foods-leads-industry-as-firstmajor-protein-company-to-adopt-greenhouse-gas-reduction-goal.
136. Press Release, Smithfield Foods, Smithfield Foods Announces Landmark Investment to
Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.smithfieldfoods.com/pressroom/company-news/smithfield-foods-announces-landmark-investment-to-reduce-greenhouse-gasemissions.
137. Steven Mufson, Companies Launch Plan to Capture Methane from Hog Manure Lagoons
(Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/energy-environment/2018/11/27/companies-launchplan-capture-methane-hog-manure-lagoons/.
138. 2018 Integrated Report, supra note 133.
139. Press Release, Smithfield Foods, Dominion Energy and Smithfield Foods Invest Half Billion
Dollars to Become Largest Renewable Natural Gas Supplier in U.S. (Oct. 23, 2019),
https://www.smithfieldfoods.com/press-room/company-news/dominion-energy-and-smithfield-foodsinvest-half-billion-dollars-to-become-largest-renewable-natural-gas-supplier-in-us.
140. John Downey, How Dominion Energy, Smithfield Foods Plan to Make NC a Leader in
Renewable
Natural
Gas,
CHARLOTTE
BUS.
J.
(Dec.
2,
2019)
https://www.bizjournals.com/charlotte/news/2019/12/02/how-dominion-energy-smithfield-foods-planto-make.html.
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Natural Gas pipeline system.141 Once complete, the companies are planning
an even larger project comprising at least 30 farms in Duplin County.142
Of the three new actors to arrive in the 2010s, at this moment it is only
clear that the last—the private law of corporate interests—will make a lasting
impact on the CAFO landscape. The CAFO and biogas revolution is already
under construction; the EJ organizations and long-suffering neighbors of
these facilities are still waiting on their remedies.
CHAPTER III: RECONCILING CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION WITH
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
Actors will be required to take swift and dramatic action to reduce GHG
emissions in order to avoid the worst impacts of climate change. But reducing
GHGs does not correct for historical inequity rooted in racism and other
systems of oppression. As Smithfield and others reap the profits of climate
mitigation, representatives of the people must compel them to finally fix the
continuing, immediate, and localized environmental harms of their
production system.
Reducing GHG emissions from CAFOs is essential given their
contribution to methane emissions. On the mitigation side, agriculture
contributes 9.3% to U.S. GHG emissions.143 Livestock manure management
alone produces methane and nitrous oxide that account for 13% of
agricultural emissions (CO2 equivalent).144 Waste-to-energy (WTE) projects
capture methane for biogas generation, which mitigates GHG emissions.145
But WTE is not the same as ESTs, which correct the local environmental
and public health harms associated with industrial hog farming. 146 The
cheapest way to build an anaerobic digester that captures methane from a
lagoon is to simply cover the lagoon with an impermeable layer of
material.147 An anaerobic digester requires no material improvement to the

141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 430-R-20-002, INVENTORY OF GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS AND SINKS 5-1 (2020) (providing 2018 GHG percentages in the U.S.).
144. Id. at 5-2 (showing that manure management contributed 9.9% and 3.1% of total estimated
agricultural release of methane and nitrous oxide, respectively).
145. Richard L. Skaggs et al., Waste-to-Energy Biofuel Production Potential for Selected
Feedstocks in the Conterminous United States, 82 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVS. 2640,
2640–41 (2017).
146. See generally id. at 2640 (concluding WTE is a way to divert wastes, such as those from hog
farms, in a way that potentially eliminates or significantly reduces adverse effects of waste resources on
public health, safety, welfare, and the environment).
147. PETER WRIGHT, OVERVIEW OF ANAEROBIC DIGESTION SYSTEMS FOR DAIRY FARMS 1-2
(2001).
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existing lagoon and spray field system. 148 In contrast, Smithfield Foods’
plans to install anaerobic digesters on existing lagoons do not mention any
intent to implement the ESTs promised by—and developed through—the
Smithfield Agreement.149
Alarmingly, WTE technology on its own may actually worsen the
impacts of the lagoon and spray field system.150 Three areas of concern are
already apparent. First, covering and pressurizing lagoons will increase
downward pressure on the cesspools, most of which remain unlined.151 The
few lagoons constructed after 1997 were required to have a clay or synthetic
lining to limit hydraulic conductivity,152 which nonetheless have been shown
to seep and leach into the environment even under normal operating
conditions. 153 Second, trapping gasses under lagoon covers further
concentrates available nutrients within the lagoon effluent that gets sprayed
onto fields. 154 Finally, the distribution of biogas will impose additional,
disproportionate burdens on communities of color. For example, getting the
gas to market increases truck traffic and requires many miles of in-ground
piping to transport unrefined gas to processing facilities.155 The Grady Road
project alone requires 30 miles of pipeline to move methane from farms to
the plant.156
Dr. C. Mike Williams understood that dismantling the lagoon and spray
field system went hand-in-hand with generating new sources of revenue from
a new waste management system.157 His 2006 report under the Smithfield
Agreement called for “expeditious” investment in further research to
improve waste management technologies, as well as “institutional incentives,
public policies, and markets related to the sale of byproducts (with priority
on energy production) that will reward farmers for utilizing technologies
148. WILLIAM F. TOOLEY, NAT’L RES. CONSERVATION SERV., NRCS 69-3A75-0-123, AEROBIC
TREATMENT OF MANURE LAGOONS SHOWING ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS WITH ECOSYSTEM SERVICE PAYBACKS 1, 5 (2013).
149. Greg Barnes, Smithfield’s Plans to Cover Hog Lagoons Could Spur N.C. Biogas Industry (Jan.
4, 2019), https://www.northcarolinahealthnews.org/2019/01/04/smithfields-plans-to-cover-hog-lagoonscould-spur-n-c-biogas-industry/.
150. Steve Davies, Smithfield Converting Manure to Energy at Hog Farms in Three States (Oct.
30, 2018), https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/11609-smithfield-converting-manure-to-energy-at-hogfarms-in-three-states.
151. Nowlin, supra note 16, at 1084.
152. 15A N.C. ADMIN. CODE. 2T.0505 (2013).
153. Nowlin, supra note 16, at 1087 n.59 (citing J.M. Ham, Seepage Losses from Animal Waste
Lagoons: A Summary of a 4-year Investigation in Kansas, 45.4 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ASAE 983, 983
(2002)).
154. ROSE M. STENGLEIN ET AL., IMPERMEABLE COVERS FOR ODOR AND AIR POLLUTION
MITIGATION IN ANIMAL AGRICULTURE: A TECHNICAL GUIDE 7 (2011).
155. Downey, supra note 140.
156. Id.
157. WILLIAMS, supra note 70, at 5.
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[that] yield improvements and environmental benefits over the current
lagoon spray field system.”158 Fourteen years later, industry has found an
energy market for its byproducts, but shows no sign of implementing ESTs.
Market incentives for biogas production will only grow as urgency for
climate action opens a firehose of private funding to de-carbonize
agriculture. As one business-oriented environmental group notes, “When the
world's largest pork producer set out to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
from its full supply chain, it sent a powerful signal to the industry at large:
By cutting emissions it's also creating new business opportunities.”159
The public sector is ready to sweeten the pot. Cap-and-trade systems and
renewable fuel standards commodify carbon offsets to provide additional
revenue streams for companies that mitigate emissions. 160 Markets are
already in place under both California and New England’s carbon budgets.161
Renewable fuel standards, both state and federal, create price premiums for
sellers of biogas and biofuels. 162 Leading presidential candidates, 163 think
tanks, 164 and academics 165 have outlined bold proposals to help farmers
generate additional revenues from climate-friendly practices including
manure management.
For nearly two decades Smithfield Foods has argued that economic
infeasibility precludes taking the necessary steps to install ESTs.166 Like a
158. Id. at 47.
159. Maggie Monast, How one Company’s Plan to turn Pollution into a Commodity Could Change
an Entire Industry, ENVTL DEF. FUND (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.edf.org/blog/2018/12/12/how-onecompanys-plan-turn-pollution-commodity-could-change-entire-industry.
160. How Cap and Trade Works, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, https://www.edf.org/climate/how-cap-andtrade-works (last visited Mar. 27, 2020).
161. Jackson Morris & Bruce Ho, California Leads Off: Now RGGI Must Grab the Climate Baton,
NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL (July 19, 2017), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/jackson-morris/california-leadsnow-rggi-must-grab-climate-baton.
162. Overview
for
Renewable
Fuel
Standard,
EPA
(Jan.
19,
2017),
https://www.epa.gov/renewable-fuel-standard-program/overview-renewable-fuel-standard.
163. See, e.g., Liz Crampton, Sen. Bernie Sanders' Plan to Expand Agriculture and Rural
Policies (May 5, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/05/bernie-sanders-agriculture-ruralpolicies-1302634.
164. See, e.g., Bidisha Bhattacharyya, Ryan Richards, & Rita Cliffton, Building a 100 Percent
Clean Future Can Drive an Additional $8 Billion a Year to Rural Communities (Jan. 8, 2020),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/reports/2020/01/08/479168/building-100-percent-cleanfuture-can-drive-additional-8-billion-year-rural-communities/.
165. See, e.g., Aashna Aggarwal et al., Achieving the Mid-Century Strategy Goals for Deep
Decarbonization in Agriculture and Forestry (Duke Univ. Nicholas Inst. For Envtl. Pol’y Solutions,
Working Paper No. NI WP 18-02, 2018) (proposing the adoption of a national carbon bank, among other
policy changes, to reduce U.S. GHG emissions).
166. See, e.g., MAJORITY REPORT FROM THE ECONOMICS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE ADVISORY
PANEL TO THE DESIGNEE UNDER THE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH
CAROLINA AND SMITHFIELD FOODS, PREMIUM STANDARD FARMS AND FRONTLINE FARMERS
REGARDING RECOMMENDATIONS ON ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY DETERMINATIONS 3–4 (2005) (asserting
that the economic feasibility of installing ESTs could be supported, but only up to a cost of $400,000 for
an “average” farm of 4320 head of cows).
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leaking lagoon, that argument hardly holds water now that the poop—a
headache to manage, even if poorly—is suddenly a revenue stream unto
itself. It’s an old adage that “you can’t make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear,”
but with a nod from regulators the swine industry will fill a silk purse from a
sow’s rear. With that windfall comes the opportunity to harmonize the EJ and
corporate sustainability interests by investing the new revenue from low-CO2
pork and biogas production into ESTs.
Now is the time for farmers, industry executives, lawmakers, and NC
regulators to seize the opportunity to end the public health and EJ crisis
caused by the lagoon and spray field system. Turning the moral imperative—
fixing the lagoon and spray field system—into reality requires robust policy
along the following lines:
1. Parties to the Smithfield Agreement should agree that converting
a lagoon into a biogas plant is a major change to an existing
waste management system that triggers mandatory EST
implementation;
2. Farmers and state regulators should add new permit conditions
to reflect the consequences of lagoon covers on existing waste
management systems, including requirements for increased
surface- and groundwater testing upstream and downstream of
installed digesters; and
3. Lawmakers should repeal Right to Farm and enact a lagoon-andspray-field conversion program to help farmers transition either
to ESTs or to return to pastured pork production.
CONCLUSION
Any lessons from reconciling EJ with climate mitigation in North
Carolina will be broadly applicable across the country. The Big Pig problem
is a microcosm of the national movement toward decarbonizing agriculture.
There is huge and growing investment in limiting GHGs and generating
carbon credits in agricultural systems. With this focus comes a real threat of
ignoring—or even worsening—other environmental, health, and justice
problems.
Climate change threatens life on earth as we know it. Avoiding the worst
effects of climate change requires emissions reductions from all sectors. As
long as swine CAFOs exist, they must capture and destroy methane.
Similarly, so long as corn and soy monocultures blanket the Midwest, they
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must use conservation tillage, cover cropping, and other conservation
practices to mitigate NOx.
However urgent and dire the climate crisis may be, paying for GHG
mitigation should not prop up a system that is poisoning our water, air, and
bodies. GHG sources do not exist in a policy vacuum; swine CAFOs in NC
are embedded in a landscape of poor communities of color that have suffered
their immediate consequences for a generation. In this context, the rise of
biogas is both a risk and an opportunity. The risk in turning methane into a
profit center is that industry will produce (and capture) more of it at the
expense of non-commodified public goods like drinkable water or breathable
air. The opportunity lies in how these revenues could be invested to finally
implementing the ESTs that industry has resisted for decades. Seizing the
opportunity will require a public mobilization on behalf of the communities
that have combatted the lagoon and spray field system for the past 30 years.

